I first encountered Wellington through Bernard Cornwell's "Sharpe" series a work of historical fiction. Those books made me wonder if Wellington was a "humanist general" (an oxymoron in the big picture) or if it was circumstance alone that forced Wellington into acts which, on the surface, appeared humane in the emediate circumstance of war.

The circumstance Wellington found himself in during the Peninsular campaign was one of constantly being in the numerical disadvantage compared to his French opponents.

Surely, Wellington's safe gaurding of his troops had more to do with this than it did any regard to thier welfare. It's tempting to think Wellington-- an Aristocrat-- perhaps felt little affinity for his low born "scum of the earth" troops?

And what of Wellington's attempts to respect the populace of Portugal and Spain? Surely, he could not militarily afford the peasentry to resist his army while moving against the French? The savagery of the French army-- an army forced to supply itself for the most part by "foraging"-- in fact stealing-- from farmers was already tying down divisions of General Soult's French army to combat the highly effective Spanish Guerilla's. While Soult had the men to do this, Wellington could spare none.

So, it's tempting to look at Wellington's more humane tactics as coming to grips with the circumstance he was in, and nothing more.

However, Longford reveals a man who is a bit more complicated. A man who, as landlord of his family's Irish estates, was loathe to evict those in arear of rent, when it was all the fashion to do so at the drop of a hat.

Would a purely Aristocratic man of his time respected not just his Sepoy troops, but the military prowess of his Indian opponents during his service in India? Wellington seemed not to be burdened with the alotment of arrogance that usually blinded others in the British Raj.

From eye witnesses, we get a view of the post battle Wellington. While many rejoiced after battle-- from infantry soldier to the officers, Wellington was morose over the carnage. On both sides. Here is a man who wept over casualty reports at Waterloo, while others wondered why he wasn't basking in the glory of THE military victory of his time.

So, it's not easy to discern what the impetous for Wellington's more humane approach to warfare. Maybe that's the point, that sound military strategy and tactics do not include unnecessary savagery?

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Maybe that's the point, that sound military strategy and tactics do not include unnecessary savagery?

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This, I believe, is fundamental in Sun Tzu's Art of War. A tract, that was theoretically available to both Napoeleon and Wellington (though I've seen no evidence they actually read it).

It struck me while reading about the battle of Waterloo itself, how Wellington conducted himself as Ceasar did in the last battle against Vercingetorix. I would tend to think it very likely that Wellington had read Ceasar's "Gallic Wars."

Maybe one of the telling points was Wellington's efforts (not allways successful) to control his troops after the siege of a town. It was accepted practice for generals to allow troops to run amoke if a town held out beyond what was reasonable. Usually, once a breach had become "practicable", a town was offered the chance to surrender. If the town opted to fight to the last man, causing both sides unnecessary casualties, the besiegers would take it out on the towns people. That's not unsound military tactics, either. It creates incentive for the besieged to surrender.

That's why the afforementioned "Art of War" by Sun Tzu is so popular with business types in the east.

I read the Wellington biography with this in mind.

When Wellington was asked what his key to sucess was he offered up, "I do the business of the day, in the day". I don't think this quite captures his true talents. A more fitting aphorism might have been "luck is the residue of good planning".

The genius of Wellington wasn't quick wit under fire, or of clever strategy. It was in concentrating before battle, all the time, on gaining whatever advantage he could.

Consider cooking.

The English used large iron kettles to cook with. These large iron kettles required a lot of fire wood to heat. An army that had to forage for wood, instead of the French technique of using a farmer's furniture or door spent more time cooking than the French. To top it off, the French used small individual tin cooking pots, which required less wood to heat.

Converting from the iron kettles to the tin pots was one of those details. There were, of course, a thousand other details.

The sum of this was that when Wellington took to the battlefield, he was able to remain flexible, because the details where already taken care of.

It seems to me Wellington did whatever could be done ahead of time to ensure success.

Shush, this is going to be on the test.

errr *ahem*.

Another uninteresting thing about Wellington was that he never lost a battle. And, he never fought a battle on ground that wasn't of his own choosing.

The possible exception to this might be the battle of Assaye. Although here, while his enemy did choose the ground, Wellington managed to turn that ground to his own advantage.

I'm trying to remember back to Ceasar's "Gallic Wars".... but off the top of my head, I don't remember Ceasar fighting a battle on ground that he didn't choose, either.

Needless to say, it's a key element for success. Handy to know if you ever find yourself in the same situations as Wellington or Ceasar.

Or, in everyday situations too.

will he ever get to the point?

That's what the "straw man" argument is all about, and the false premise. Your opponent in debate uses this tactic to get you to argue a point that isn't yours to begin with-- effectively moving you off your "ground" and onto his or hers.

This is what makes the left's task in "setting the agenda" so difficult. With the media in the hip pocket of the aristocracy, we find ourselves more often than not fighting on the ground of our opponent's choosing.

The media is the "ground" we fight on.

God, I think he's finished.