Learning from How Conservatives Push Their Cultural Worldview
By Sara Robinson,March 14, 2008
AlterNet/Blog for Our FutureThis is part II of a series. Click here to read part I, "What We Can Learn from Conservatives About Winning in Politics."
As we saw in the previous post, the entire conservative movement was organized around the single goal of changing the country's dominant worldview, weaning it away from liberal assumptions about how the world works, and teaching Americans to assign meaning to the world using conservative values instead. They firmly (and rightly) believed that that once the rest of the country evaluated and prioritized reality the same way they did, the rest of the conservative political, economic, and social agenda could be implemented with strong popular support, and no meaningful resistance.
But the early architects of this plan, including Paul Weyrich, also realized that having strong ideas wasn't enough. To succeed, they would also have to master the arts of persuasion.
"Ideas do not immediately have consequences," wrote Eric Huebeck in his 2001 update of Weyrich's long-followed plan. "They do not have an impact in direct proportion to the truth they contain. They have an impact only insofar as adherents of those ideas are willing to take measures to propagate those ideas."
Or, as a more cynical conservative once put it: You gotta catapult the propaganda.
This may seem like heresy to liberals. We like to believe that the progressive worldview is so patently superior that intelligent people will readily see the logic of it, and then sensibly adopt it as the best way to think and live. If people resist it, it's only because they don't completely understand it (yet). Fixing that is simply a matter of education: we just need explain our vision more clearly. Our own resolute faith in the power of reason convinces us that reasonable people will be reasonably persuaded by reasonable discussion of reasonable ideas.
It's time to consider the reasonable possibility that we may be wrong. (...)
Liberals operate from a position of strength on the battlefield of ideas -- and this may be why we consistently overvalue reason and undervalue emotional appeals. Our ideas do have a strong intellectual appeal. But we tend to forget that they also have a far healthier emotional appeal, since we don't have to resort to stimulating fear and hate to get people to buy into them. Still, we've been notoriously terrible at stirring people's more positive and hopeful emotions, and getting them to resonate on a soul-deep level with the values that define our worldview. Clearly, we could stand to learn a thing or two from the conservatives about how they did this. (...)
The first thing we need to do is lighten way up on the long recitations of facts and figures and programs and policies. Most non-wonks don't care about this stuff -- the details just make them yawn. They're bored by promises of new programs: most Americans are pretty well convinced by now that whatever the program is or how well-funded it may be, they probably won't see any personal benefit from it, so it comes across as an empty promise. Yet Democratic candidates all the way back to Walter Mondale have been running and losing on just this kind of dispassionate, uninspiring wonk-talk. And then we wonder why the conservatives keep whipping our asses.
You'll seldom catch conservatives talking wonky. They're told from their very first candidate trainings to steer clear of anything that dwells on abstract facts or figures. People want viscerally engaging stories -- emotional stories about people like them, inspiring mythic tales taken from history that express their highest ideals, vivid invocations outlining the shining details of a better future to come. They want clear-cut portrayals of good guys and bad guys that reverberate with the promise that justice will be done, and that they will be honored in the end as agents for good. We may grow up, but we never lose our childhood taste for an illustrative tale well-told. The conservatives knew this from the beginning, and turned this knowledge into a potent political strategy. (...)